

Ground Threat

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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT
TO INDIA

18 MARCH 1963

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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT TO INDIA

1. We estimate that the Chinese logistics base in Sinkiang and Tibet is sufficiently developed to support a garrisoned force of some 200,000 men, or 165,000 combat troops in attacks across the frontier into India.
2. Although the maximum number of ground forces that the Chinese could employ and logistically support in simultaneous attacks all along the Sino-Indian border is estimated to be 165,000, we believe that the main threat to India and the Himalayan border states consists of attacks (1) in Ladakh, (2) through the border passes into India, (3) into Nepal, and (4) through Bhutan and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) into northern Assam by 5 infantry divisions (light), 14 infantry regiments, and 2 airborne battalions, totalling about 120,000 troops. The most favorable period for these ground operations occurs from October through December. These offensives could be supported by tactical air operations involving about 290 aircraft (a reasonable mix would be 180 jet fighters, 50 jet light bombers, and 60 piston light bombers).
3. These attacks, we believe, would have the following military objectives:
 - a. In Ladakh an extension of Chinese control to include the capture of the important communications center of Leh.
 - b. In the border area between Ladakh and Nepal to seize the Chinese territorial claim in the Bara Hoti area and possibly to pose a psychological threat to New Delhi.
 - c. In Nepal to facilitate the eventual occupation of the country by seizure of the major valley approaches and Katmandu.
 - d. In the East the effective occupation of the NEFA and that part of Assam north of the Brahmaputra River. To accomplish this objective the Chinese could either temporarily occupy the key communications centers of Siliguri or Hasimara, or effect a strong lodgement in the Gauhati area. Of the two, we believe that the Chinese would choose to establish the Gauhati salient because it would not only effectively deny the Indians eastward communications and at the same time greatly assist the Chinese advances into central and eastern NEFA, but also would be militarily the easier and less costly venture.

In The West

4. The road net leading from Sinkiang and western Tibet into Ladakh and to the Sino-Indian border will logistically support an estimated seven infantry divisions (light). This capability exists for operations within Ladakh and north of the frontier; for operations into Indian territory, however, this support capability drops to less than four divisions as motorable roads give way to pack trails. Therefore, the magnitude of the Chinese threat in this region is limited by the logistic difficulties that would be encountered in Indian territory, rather than by the number of troops that could be concentrated and supported on the Chinese side of the frontier.
5. After several months of military stockpiling and troop reinforcement operations, the Chinese could launch the following attacks in the western sector of the frontier:
 - a. One infantry regiment to Panamik.
 - b. One infantry division (light) to Leh.

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- c. Two infantry regiments through Shipki Pass to Chini.
 - d. Not more than three infantry regiments through Manu and Niti passes to Josimath.
 - e. One infantry regiment through Lipulek Pass to Dharchula.
6. Because of logistic limitations and the need to improve road systems as they advance, Chinese military objectives would probably be limited to an extension of their control of the Ladakh area to include the capture of the key communications center of Leh. It is not believed that the Chinese, in their initial attack, could advance beyond Leh.

In Nepal

7. Because of the inaccessability of Nepal, the Chinese probably could do little more than move individual regiments through the border passes to establish blocking positions at population centers on the main north-south valley approaches.
8. They could, however, after airdropping up to two airborne battalions onto the Katmandu airfield, follow with an airlift of one lightly-equipped division.
9. It is estimated that the Chinese could not occupy Nepal up to the Indian frontier, and their tenure of northern Nepal would be entirely dependent on stockpiling, their ability to sustain portage operations through the northern passes, and the retention of air supremacy over the Katmandu area.

In The East

10. In the Sikkim-Bhutan-NEFA sector of the eastern frontier region, the Chinese, having had the opportunity to stockpile supplies and complete troop reinforcement of the forward border areas, could launch the following initial attacks over existing roads and trails:
- a. Either: Two infantry divisions (light) to Gangtok.
Or: One infantry division (light) to Pharo Dzong.
Or: Two infantry regiments to Lhunsi Dzong and two infantry regiments to Tashigang Dzong.
Or: One infantry division to Tezpur.
 - b. Plus: Two infantry regiments 30 miles south of the frontier at Longju.
 - c. Plus: One infantry division (light) to Tegang.
11. Due to the low optimum surplus tonnage available in the area south of Lhasa and between the Chumbi Valley and Bum La, we do not believe that military operations could be supported simultaneously in both Sikkim and the eastern Bhutan-western NEFA area.
12. Subsequent to road improvements the Chinese could continue their attacks as follows:
- a. Either: Three infantry divisions (light) and two standard divisions (with armor) to Siliguri.

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- Or: One infantry division (light) to Hasimara.
- Or: Two infantry divisions (light) to Gauhati.
- Or: One infantry division (light) to Tezpur.
- b. Plus: Two infantry regiments 30 miles south of the frontier at Longju.
- c. Plus: One infantry division (light) to Balamaghani.

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SECRETANNEX A: MILITARY CONSIDERATIONSA. General

1. Of Communist China's 34 armies*, 8 armies are located within the area adjacent to Korea, 5 armies are adjacent to-- or flanking--the Taiwan Strait, 4 armies occupy the Southeast Asia border area, and 11 armies constitute the strategic reserve disposed in North and East-Central China. Less than 5% of the Chinese Army's ground strength is located in the western half of the country.

2. China's troop dispositions, therefore, appear to be directed towards coastal and border defense. A secondary mission for all armies is internal security and, notably in Tibet, this function has in the past been the main occupation of the combat units stationed there. A major offensive effort against India would therefore require the redeployment of several divisions from eastern China. However, Chinese Communist military strength is more than sufficient to double their current troop strength in Tibet without seriously affecting defensive and internal security obligations in other areas.

B. Tactics and Techniques

1. In the Himalayan region the physiographic effects on mountain operations are enormous. The use of trucks, armor, and artillery is limited by the inadequate roadnet and adversely affected by the climate; maintenance is a continuing problem. Troops tire easily, combat loads must be reduced, and daily march times and distances must be shortened. Logistical problems, particularly those of resupply; communications in the rugged mountain areas and during periods of low temperatures; and the control of large units in coordinated combined arms operations all are difficult. Such conditions require modifications in organization, equipment, and tactics on the part of units engaged in combat.

2. Tactical movements require more detailed preparations than those normal at lower elevations; as much of the movement as possible is conducted by vehicles to conserve the strength of the troops. Reconnaissance and security on the march require special attention. In all foot movements rests are carefully scheduled to avoid exhaustion. Tactical operations will rarely take place at an echelon above that of the regiment. The regiment and the battalion are the units usually employed along a single axis against a single tactical objective. Operations are characterized by infiltration, ambushes, wide flanking movements, meeting engagements, and sudden concentrations for specific missions. Secrecy and speed of movement are sought by every possible means.

C. Equipment

1. The standard organization of the Chinese Communist infantry division and regiment probably has been modified to conform to the decentralized operational requirements of mountain operations. The largest artillery piece employed under normal circumstances probably would be the 122 mm howitzer. However, in the recent fighting on the Sino-Indian border the Chinese used 120 mm mortars, 76.2 mm mountain guns, and recoilless rifles. Motor

* The Chinese Communist "Army" resembles a US Corps, its basic tactical components consisting of three infantry divisions.

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transportation elements are drastically reduced and animal and human transport capabilities substantially increased. Although tanks have been reported in Ladakh and in the Chumbi Valley, there is no evidence that the Chinese have large numbers of tanks in Tibet. It is believed that only in an attack through Sikkim could tanks be employed in other than an assault artillery role.

2. Personnel and materiel of the Chinese Communist infantry division (light) and the independent infantry regiment are shown in Appendix 1 to this Annex.

D. Airborne and Air Resupply Operations

1. It is estimated that the Chinese could employ airborne forces to seize an airfield required for resupply of advancing ground forces, or to prevent Indian redeployment, or to "leap-frog" Indian defensive positions.

2. It is estimated that not more than two battalions could be dropped in a single lift.

3. Aircraft characteristics and lift capacities of transport aircraft available for support operations in the frontier region are shown in Appendix 2 to this Annex.

E. Climate

Refer to Appendix 3 to this Annex for a discussion of the effects of climate on ground and air operations in the frontier region.

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ANNEX B: THE LOGISTICS BASE

A. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest Sinkiang and Tibet are transported overland from base depots at Urumchi, Lanchou and Chengtu via the following main supply routes:

1. From the Urumchi railhead to the southwest Sinkiang supply base at Kashgar. While Kashgar is primarily responsible for the logistical support of those units in the Yarkand and Ladakh areas, some support probably is provided to troops located in extreme western Tibet.

2. From Lanchou supplies are moved over the Tsinghai-Tibet road to the Nagchhu Dzong distribution depot serving west, central, and southern Tibet.

3. Military supplies from the Chengtu rail transshipment point are delivered to Changtu via the Szechwan-Tibet highway. The Changtu depots support forces located in eastern Tibet and along the frontier from Lima west to probably Milin.

B. Under optimum conditions a total of 2,000 tons per day could be delivered to the military sub-districts in southwest Sinkiang and Tibet. This tonnage, however, is unlikely to be achieved during all periods of the year due to climatic reductions to the capacities of the main supply routes. Therefore, it is estimated that the maximum sustained tonnage available at supply distribution points in Sinkiang and Tibet is 1,600 tons per day. This tonnage is sufficient to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of a garrison force of 200,000, or 165,000 attacking ground troops supported by offensive and defensive air operations requiring approximately 450 tons of the 1,600 tons delivered overland daily.

C. The daily resupply requirements for the Chinese Communist infantry division (standard), the infantry division (light), and the independent infantry regiment are shown in Appendix 1 to this Annex.

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SECRETANNEX C: THE GROUND THREATA. The Threat in the West

In the western sector of the frontier region attacks in the following areas are considered:

1. Ladakh into Indian-held Kashmir.
2. Through border passes between Ladakh and Nepal.

B. The Ladakh Area1. Avenues of Approach

a. As early as 1957, the Chinese Communists completed a road from Sinkiang across Ladakh to western Tibet. From this road, the Chinese have constructed numerous feeder roads, including one in the west that roughly parallels the main road and permits the movement of troops and supplies to outposts in Ladakh. In many places the valleys provide natural roadbeds that require little construction or maintenance to be made usable for motor transport.

b. The approach routes from Ladakh converge on Leh across the Karakoram and Ladakh Ranges; through the Saser Pass (17,480 ft) to Panamik from the north and via Chushul and Shyok from the southeast. Of these, the latter, a motorable route, is by far the more favorable avenue of approach. From Leh the road twists across two great mountain ranges to Srinagar, the major Indian military base in Kashmir.

2. Military Capabilities

a. In an advance through the Saser Pass to Panamik (120 miles), the terrain and trail capacity limit the size of the attacking force to one regiment. Since Saser Pass is closed from December to May, the resupply of this regiment during the winter months would have to be accomplished by air drop or by road from Chushul.

b. Given sufficient engineer support for road improvement, one infantry division (light) could be supported from the Chushul area, with two regiments advancing to Leh (120 miles) and one regiment supporting the northern thrust to Panamik by advancing up the Shyok River Valley to the area of Tirit (140 miles).

C. The Border Passes between Ladakh and Nepal1. Avenues of Approach

a. Along the border between the Chushul area in southern Ladakh and Nepal there are several border passes through which Chinese combat forces could attack. Of these, the best avenues of approach, although they follow caravan trails through narrow defiles and are subject to blockage by snow during the winter months, are through Shipki Pass (15,400 ft), Manu Pass (17,890 ft), Niti Pass (16,600 ft), and Lipulek Pass (17,900 ft).

2. Military Capabilities

a. During the period June to September, two infantry regiments could be supported in an advance through Shipki Pass to

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the vicinity of Chini (45 miles); not more than 3 regiments through Manu and Niti Passes to Josimath (approximately 45 miles); and one regiment through Lipulek Pass to the general area of Dharchula (20 miles).

b. Further advances beyond Chini, Josimath, and Dharchula could not be logistically supported until the Chinese had improved the existing trails to at least one-ton capacities. Further, it is believed that in the absence of aerial re-supply during the winter months (December-March), the regiments would be forced to withdraw to north of the passes.

D. The Threat Against Nepal1. Avenues of Approach

a. The Chinese are known to have built roads to within a few miles of the Sino-Nepalese border opposite the five major entry routes and they have good lateral communications with the entire length of the frontier from the Shigatse-Gartok road and its feeder roads in the east to Tingri Dzong. Trails lead from these roads to all the Sino-Nepalese border passes, many of which are open for much of the winter for porter convoys. The Chinese are now building a road which approaches the frontier and which will eventually lead to Katmandu.

b. Caravan routes lead through the following major passes all of which are favorable approach routes for Chinese attacks: Naralagna, Kore La, Kyriang La, Kodari Pass, and Rakha La.

2. Military Capabilities

a. It is estimated that the Chinese could air drop up to two battalions to seize the Katmandu airfield, and could then within five to seven days air land up to one lightly-equipped infantry division. They could support this force by air indefinitely, provided they retained tactical air superiority in the area.

b. In addition it is estimated that by the utilization of pack animals and the mobilization of all available Tibetan and Nepalese porters the Chinese could support the following attacks:

1. Through Naralagna Pass to Bajang: one infantry regiment.
2. Through Kore La to Dana: one infantry regiment.
3. Through Kyriang La to Nawakot: one infantry regiment.
4. Through Kodari Pass to Dhulikhel: one infantry regiment.
5. Through Rakha La to Dingla: one infantry regiment.

E. The Threat in the East

In the eastern sector of the frontier region attacks in the following areas are considered:

1. Chumbi Valley through Sikkim to the Siliguri area.
2. Through western Bhutan to the Hasimara area.
3. Through eastern Bhutan and western NEFA to the Gauhati area.
4. Across the McMahon Line into central and eastern NEFA.

SECRETF. The Sikkim Area1. Avenues of Approach

a. There are two converging avenues of approach from the Chumbi Valley through Sikkim to Siliguri. One, a motorable road, leads through Natu Pass (14,500 ft) via Gangtok and Kalimpong; the other, an unimproved road, crosses the frontier through Jelep Pass joining the former at Kalimpong.

2. Military Capabilities

a. It is estimated that the Chinese could attack through the Natu and Jelep Passes with two infantry divisions (light) and advance to Gangtok (34 miles) without improving the roads. If the road capacities between the frontier and Gangtok were increased (estimated 6-10 weeks), a total of three infantry divisions (light) and two standard infantry divisions with armor could be supported in an advance to Siliguri (100 miles).

b. In the initial attack up to two airborne battalions could be dropped in rear of the forward Indian defensive positions.

c. If prepared to violate Bhutanese neutrality, the Chinese could turn the established Indian defensive positions in Sikkim by making an initial attack down the Torsa River Valley, which generally parallels the north-south orientation of the western Bhutan border.

d. Overland logistic support of a force in the Siliguri area during the winter months would be extremely difficult, and unless stocks of supplies were captured or airfields secured to support air lift operations a withdrawal to the Darjeeling area and a reduction in strength to not more than one division would be necessary.

G. Western Bhutan to the Hasimara Area1. Avenue of Approach

There is one avenue of approach through western Bhutan to Hasimara. An undeveloped trail from Phari Dzong joins the road from Pharo Dzong to Hasimara.

2. Military Capabilities

a. It is estimated that the Chinese could advance to Pharo Dzong with one division without improving the trail. If the trail between the frontier and Pharo Dzong were improved to permit the movement of 3-ton vehicles, this division could be supported in an advance to Hasimara.

b. Overland logistic support of this division in the Hasimara area during the winter would be possible provided stockpiling had been carried out immediately after and during the attack.

c. It is estimated that the Chinese could employ up to two airborne battalions to seize the airfield at Hasimara at the same time that the infantry division moved out of the Himalayan foothills.

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H. The Eastern Bhutan-Western NEFA Area

1. Avenues of Approach

a. The construction and maintenance of roads in the frontier area of the NEFA by both China and India have been hampered by rugged terrain and heavy rainfall. The most highly developed network in the vicinity of the frontier is in Tibet, and the relatively good logistical system supporting the western sector of NEFA is reflected in the number of troops the Chinese deployed during the recent border campaign. The favorable avenues of approach into Assam are:

1. Two converging routes across Bhutan:

(a) From Lhakhang Dzong to Gauhati via Lhunsi Dzong and Dewangiri.

(b) From Bum La to Gauhati via Towang, Tashigang Dzong, and Dewangiri.

2. In northwest NEFA from Bum La via the motorable road through Towang and Bomdi La to Tezpur.

2. Military Capabilities

a. In an advance through Bhutan the Chinese initially could support two infantry regiments at Tashigang Dzong (50 miles), and two infantry regiments at Lhunsi Dzong (30 miles). After road improvements, the Chinese could maintain three infantry divisions (light) within Bhutan, or advance to Gauhati (145 miles) with at least two divisions. The Chinese could drop two airborne battalions at the northern end of the Gauhati bridge, to destroy the bridge and delay Indian reinforcement.

b. It is estimated that, if the Chinese were to repeat their attack from Bum La to Bomdi La (90 miles) they could logistically support two infantry divisions (light) at Bomdi La. One division could be supported at Tezpur (200 miles).

I. Central and Eastern NEFA

1. Avenues of Approach

There are two avenues of approach across the McMahon Line into NEFA:

a. In central NEFA from the border town of Longju south through the Subansiri River Valley.

b. In eastern NEFA from Lima through the Luhit River Valley via Walong.

2. Military Capabilities

a. A penetration in the central NEFA sector would be restricted to a distance over which porter supply lines could be operated. It is estimated that, at a maximum, the Chinese could support two regiments in the Subansiri River Valley up to 30 miles south of the border.

b. In the eastern part of the NEFA the Chinese could initially support an attack by one infantry division (light) in the Luhit River Valley as far west as Tepang (45 miles).

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Subsequent to the development of a road to Tepang (estimated 8-10 weeks), the Chinese could support up to three infantry divisions (light) in this area and advance to Balamaghani (55 miles) with one division.

3. It is estimated that the objective in a major attack in the East would be to disrupt Indian communications with Assam either by seizing the important communications centers of Siliguri or Hasimara, or by establishing a salient in the area of Gauhati north of the Brahmaputra River.

4. If the Chinese could improve the roads through Bhutan with sufficient speed to sustain their attack to Gauhati, they probably could stockpile sufficient supplies in this salient to support their troops throughout the winter of 1963.

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(C) APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A: PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT) AND THE INDEPENDENT INFANTRY REGIMENT

Item	Total	Hq and Staff	Chem Co	Sig Bn	Ren Co	Engr Bn	AT Bn	AAAW Bn	Band	Ord Plt	Arty Regt	Each Inf Regt	Ind Inf Regt
Officers	1685	210									207	352	352
Enlisted	15176	710	9	41	10	39	54	57	1	1	1290	3791	3791
Gun, 76.2 mm, Mtn	24										24	9	6
Gun, AT 57/76 mm	39						12					9	4
Mortar, 160-mm	12											9	9
Mortar, 120-mm	27											9	27
Mortar, 82-mm	81											9	9
Mortar, 57-mm	27											9	9
Rel Rfl, 75-mm	27											9	9
Rel Rfl, 75-mm	54											18	18
RL, 90-mm	51							24				9	9
AAWG, 12.7-mm	135											45	45
HMG, 7.62-mm	378											117	117
LMG, 7.62-mm	3343		18	18	9	18		77		4	203	919	919
SMG, 7.62-mm	8437		116	213	112	42		297		33	1075	2038	2038
Carbine, 7.62-mm	1686		7	36	7	31		45	2	1	146	414	414
Pistol, 7.62-mm	Unk	169											
Flamethrower	57		Unk			12							
Trk, Cargo, 6x6	15										24	7	7
Trk, Cargo, 4x2	15										12	1	1
Trk, 1-ton, 4x4	5											1	1
Motorcycle	15	2	5	15									
Bicycle	15												
Cart	Unk												
Horse, Mule, or Camel	775+	135+						Unk				Unk	Unk

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(S) APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A: AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS AND LIFT CAPACITIES OF THE 13TH CCAF AIR DIVISION^{1/} TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE SINO-INDIAN FRONTIER REGION

Aircraft Type ^{3/}	Range/Radius	Initial Lift ^{2/}				Sustained Operations ^{2/}			
		Cargo (tons) Airlanded	Troops Airdropped	Cargo (tons) Airlanded	Troops Airdropped	Cargo (tons) Airdropped	Troops Airdropped	Cargo (tons) Airdropped	Troops Airdropped
IL-12/COACH	1,600/720	57.0	39.4	504	432	35.6	24.9	315	270
IL-14/CRATE	1,600/720	30.4	21.3	269	230	19.0	13.3	168	144
C-46/COMMANDO	1,600/720(est)	<u>133.9</u>	<u>93.8</u>	<u>1,120</u>	<u>896</u>	<u>84.0</u>	<u>58.8</u>	<u>700</u>	<u>560</u>
TOTAL		221.3	154.5	1,893	1,558	138.6	97.0	1,183	974

- 1/ Only the 13th CCAF Air Division is considered trained and available for operations in the Sino-Indian Border area.
- 2/ The above data is based on 80 per cent serviceability for the initial lift and 50 per cent serviceability for sustained operations.
- 3/ For single aircraft operations the following factors may be used: IL-12/COACH and IL-14/CRATE, 4,750 lbs of cargo or 24 troops airlanded and 3,325 lbs of cargo or 18 troops airdropped; C-46/COMMANDO, 12,000 lbs of cargo or 50 troops airlanded and 8,400 lbs of cargo or 40 troops airdropped.

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SECRET(C) APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A: THE EFFECT OF
CLIMATE ON GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS
IN THE SINO-INDIAN FRONTIER REGIONI. General

In order to localize discussion of the effects of climate on ground and air operations in the Himalayan frontier region, the area is divided into two sectors. The western sector encompasses northern Kashmir (Ladakh), the high central Tibetan plateau, and most of Nepal. The eastern sector extends from eastern Nepal through Sikkim, Bhutan and all of the NEFA and includes Lhasa to the north and a narrow belt along the Brahmaputra River Valley to the south.

II. The Western SectorA. Ground Operations

1. Summer, lasting from June to September, is mild with day temperatures well above freezing and some frosts at night. The snow line recedes to about 18,000 feet. Drought conditions generally prevail, except in western Ladakh where heavy rain from the southwest monsoon causes landslides and swollen streams from April to October. Except in western Ladakh, summer is favorable for military operations and near optimum tonnages may be expected.

2. Autumn, from mid-October to mid-December, is the best season for military operations and optimum tonnages may be expected.

3. Winter lasts from December to March. Temperatures are severe and winds occasionally reaching gale force not only make the cold difficult to endure, but also fill the air with fine penetrating dust. Snowstorms and blizzards are frequent, particularly in the mountains. The severe temperatures are the greatest deterrent to military operations, and roads through high passes are likely to be blocked by snow drifts. Generally, road capacities probably will be near the optimum.

4. Spring occurs during April and May and is the most difficult season for military operations in the mountainous areas. Melting snow makes streams unfordable and the main, flat-floored valleys are often flooded, particularly in the Ladakh area. Frosts occur almost every night, but day temperatures move above freezing. All roads in this area are liable to obstruction by spring floods, landslides, and washouts. Road tonnages frequently will be minimal.

B. Air Operations

1. During November through April, 5-10 days per month of clear weather and 15-20 days of clear to partly scattered cloudy weather occur. Cloudiness during this period is predominantly of the middle and high type, and is associated with frontal passages from the West. Some radiation fog occurs during this period. From May to October, 15-20 clear days per month, and 20-25 clear to scattered cloudy days per month can be expected. The afternoons are more cloudy than other times of the day during these months.

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2. In Tibet, during the May-October period, scattered to broken cumulus cloudiness occurs during the daylight hours with middle clouds occurring at night. From November to May, there is little cloudiness and excellent flying conditions exist.

III. The Eastern SectorA. Ground Operations

1. Summer, which lasts from June to September, is warm in the Lhasa area and very hot and wet in NEFA. Rainfall varies greatly each year but averages 15-20 inches a year in Lhasa, rising to about 100 inches in NEFA. During the southeast monsoon, roads in the Brahmaputra Valley and in the Lhasa area may be obstructed by flooding, and in NEFA the heavy rain may cause washouts and landslides. Optimum road capacities may be attained throughout the area for short periods during the summer. During the southeast monsoon, flooding washouts and landslides may reduce road capacities to the minimum.

2. Autumn is from mid-October to mid-December. During this period the weather is often clear and more free from rain and cloud than at any other period. This is the most favorable season for military operations. Optimum tonnages may be expected until the first winter snows arrive.

3. Winter lasts from mid-December to March. Although the snowline may be down to 7,000 feet in places, the weather is generally cool except at high altitudes. High winds result in patchy snow coverage, except in the high mountains where passes may be blocked for short periods by snow drifts. Road conditions will be average and near optimum tonnages will prevail except for short periods on routes over high passes.

4. Spring months are April and May. Day temperatures are generally above freezing, though severe frosts occur at night. Occasional rain, sleet, and snow showers are scattered. Road conditions will be fair, though flooding, unfordable streams and rockfalls caused by the thaw may obstruct some routes for short periods. Near optimum tonnages may be achieved.

B. Air Operations

1. During December to March, 20-25 clear days per month can be expected, and 5-10 clear days per month during the transitional period of April and May. In the monsoon season from June through September, only one clear day per month occurs on the average, except in the NEFA, where 5-10 days per month of clear weather might be expected.

2. In general, good flying weather can be anticipated: 90% of the time from December through March, 75% of the time from April through May, and only 5% of the time during the monsoon season of June through September. During the transitional period between the monsoon season and the onset of winter, good flying weather can be expected 50% of the time in October and 85% of the time in November.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B: DAILY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST INFANTRY DIVISION (STANDARD), THE INFANTRY DIVISION
(LIGHT) AND THE INDEPENDENT INFANTRY REGIMENT

1. Infantry Division (Standard) (at 85% TOE)

	<u>Maximum</u> (average combat)	<u>Minimum</u> (static, no action)
Class I (Rations)	24.6	24.6
Class II & IV (General Supplies)	22.3	2.0
Class III (POL)	28.0	7.0
Class V (Ammunition)	<u>54.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>
TOTAL	128.9	35.6

2. Infantry Division (Light) (at 85% TOE)

	<u>Maximum</u> (continuous light combat)	<u>Minimum</u> (patrol actions only)
Class I (Rations)	23.6	23.6
Class II & IV (General Supplies)	21.5	2.0
Class III (POL)	3.1	nil (pack animals and porters only)
Class V (Ammunition)	<u>28.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>
TOTAL	76.2	27.6

3. Independent Infantry Regiment (at 85% TOE)

	<u>Maximum</u> (continuous light combat)	<u>Minimum</u> (patrol actions only)
Class I (Rations)	7.6	7.6
Class II & IV (General Supplies)	7.0	.6
Class III (POL)	1.0	nil (pack animals and porters only)
Class V (Ammunition)	<u>7.0</u>	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL	22.6	8.8

Note: All figures are expressed in short tons.